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BOOK REVIEW
FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW, by WALTER T. CHAMPION,
JR., Lawyer's Co-operative Publishing Co., Rochester, New
York 1990, 535 pp.
Fundamentals of Sports Law' is written so that it is equally
understandable to both attorneys and non-attorneys, and the
result is a work that leans heavily toward the non-attorney. The
elements of negligence are often repeated, leaving readers with
the feeling that they have already read the section. This feeling
also holds true with the case law sections, where the same cases
are used repeatedly in an effort to explain the different elements
of negligence and the different types of liability (i.e. a school's, a
coach's, or a referee's liability). While this repetition detracts
some from overall readability when the book is read straight
through, it will probably not be a problem when the book is used
primarily as a reference and each chapter is read individually.
When the book is used in this manner, its organization is advanta-
geous, because only a single chapter has to be read in order to gain
an understanding of a particular aspect of liability.
This review of Fundamentals of Sports Law will be done
chapter by chapter, emphasizing the areas covered in each chap-
ter. The first half of the book deals with torts in sports, beginning
with chapter one, which discusses the elements of negligence and
applies these elements to case law. This chapter is easily under-
stood by the non-attorney, and provides a good review for the
attorney. The next chapters divide liability into areas such as
school, coach, referee, medical, and facility. In these chapters,
many of the same cases are used to show more than one type of
liability. Also, each chapter restates and re-explains the elements
of negligence.
School administrators will be interested in the chapter on
school liability, especially the section on failure to hire competent
coaches.2 As the number of coaches leaving the coaching ranks
increases, requiring administrators to go outside the school system
to recruit new coaches, the potential for hiring an incompetent
coach increases as well. Professor Champion gives a list of recom-
mendations for school administrators to follow in order to limit
1. W. CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAw, at vii (Lawyer's Co-op 1990).
2. Id. at § 2.5.
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school liability.3 However, a school administrator forced to hire
uncertified personnel will have a hard time following the recom-
mendations for hiring competent coaches.
Chapter three deals with coaches' liability, with an emphasis
on the need for proper preparation of the athlete to avoid liability
for injury to that athlete.4 An interesting development in this area
is exemplified by a New Jersey statute that limits liability for negli-
gent acts committed by coaches.' At first glance, this statute
appears to limit coaches liability. However, only volunteer
coaches are protected, and not those coaches that are hired.8
Chapter four recognizes an increase in litigation over the
years involving referees and other officials.7 An interesting area of
an official's liability is the duty to anticipate reasonably foreseeable'
dangers.8 While dangers such as slippery courts, electrical storms,
and metal spikes protruding from the ground are discussed,9 the
book mentions nothing about foreseeable injuries that result from
physically mismatched opponents. Liability for officials could be a
special problem in this area when the coach is a volunteer and has
been given immunity by statute. Conceivably, an official trying to
avoid liability in this kind of situation could decide that one team is
so much stronger than its opponent that the game cannot be
played. A discussion of this potential type of liability would have
been interesting.
The chapter on medical liability discusses concepts such as
duty of care and duty to disclose.'0 The chapters on products liabil-
ity, 1 participant injuries,' 2 spectator injuries,' 3 and facility liabil-
ity' 4 discuss the concerns particular to those areas. Much of the
case law in the area of participant injury overlaps with that of
school liability, coach liability, and referee liability. Also, there is
overlap in the areas of spectator injury and facility liability.
Chapter ten discusses two of the defenses commonly used in
liability cases: assumption of risk and contributory negligence.15
3. Id. at § 2.9, at 55-56.
4. Id. at § 3.4.
5. Id. at § 3.6, at 72. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 62A-B (West 1987 & Supp. 1990).
6. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 62A-6 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990).
7. CHAMPION, supra note 1, at § 4.1.
8. Id. at § 4.4.
9. Id.
10. Id. at § 5.2, 5.3.
11. Id. at § 6.1-6.4.
12. CHAMPION, supra note 1, at §§ 7.1-7.6.
13. Id. at §§ 8.1-8.5.
14. Id. at §§ 9.1-9.7.
15. Id. at §§ 10.1, 10.2, 10.4.
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As Professor Champion notes, these defenses are being replaced in
many jurisdictions by a comparative negligence standard.16 What
is not discussed is whether the application of this new standard will
change liability, or lack of it, from past case law. An example is the
understanding that a spectator at a baseball game assumes the risk
of being hit by a foul ball.' 7 Another example is when an athlete
assumes the risk of injuries incident to the sport.' 8 In both cases,
there is no recovery because of the assumption of risk doctrine.
The question is whether a comparative negligence standard also
yields no recovery. If the answer is no, a comparative negligence
standard could have a tremendous impact in the area of sports
law---an issue that is not discussed by the author.
Other defenses are discussed in chapters 11 and 12, including
waivers, releases, and sovereign immunity. The main concern
with waivers is that the wording must be specific enough to cover
the particular liability being denied.' 9 It should also be noted that
a release is usually not binding against a minor, which is signifi-
cant, since many schools routinely use releases in an effort to limit
liability.20 The defense of sovereign immunity does not have the
certainty it once enjoyed. Professor Champion emphasizes that an
attorney is well advised to be sure of the current status of the sov-
ereign immunity in the jurisdiction in which the attorney is
practicing.2 '
Chapter 13, dealing with defamation and invasion of privacy,
is of interest to a sportswriter or sportscaster who deals with these
concerns on a day-to-day basis. Chapter 14 deals with workers
compensation and the effect it may have on recovery by an
injured professional athlete. Chapter 15 involves the calculation
of damages and includes a hypothetical situation involving dam-
ages for an injury sustained by a fourteen-year-old athlete.
The next section of the book involves constitutional implica-
tions of sports law. The analysis of the constitutional issues may be
beyond the understanding of the average non-attorney, but those
readers should still be able to apply the conclusions. Chapter 16
addresses the general issues involved in athlete eligibility require-
ments. The key in this area appears to be whether participation in
16. Id. at § 10.3.
17. Id. at § 10.6, at 200.
18. Id. at § 7.6, at 141.
19. Id. at § 11.2.
20. Id. at § 11.5.
21. Id. at § 12.1, at 222.
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sports is a right or a privilege.2 Some courts have found a prop-
erty interest in participation when it can be shown that eligibility
requirements might affect the athlete's chances of obtaining a col-
lege scholarship or of being drafted by a professional team.23 Pro-
fessor Champion discusses the difference between fundamental
rights and non-fundamental rights and the different levels of scru-
tiny that the court will apply.24 A non-attorney, even if confused
by the concepts of strict scrutiny or rational basis review, would
still be able to tell, from the examples given, what types of require-
ments are examined more closely by the courts. One other note of
interest to a person involved in college sports is the idea that
NCAA action is not state action, and, therefore, does not invoke
the protection of the fourteenth amendment.Z
Chapter 17 discusses NCAA Proposition 48 and proposed
Proposition 42, which concern academic eligibility requirements
for NCAA member schools.26 Professor Champion concludes that
Proposition 42 will be found constitutional (as 48 already has
been), even though it has been attacked as being racist.
Chapter 18 discusses the "no pass, no play" rule. Here, Pro-
fessor Champion concludes that this type of rule, while having cer-
tain flaws, only requires rational basis scrutiny, since it does not
involve a fundamental right.28
Chapter 19 describes sex discrimination in the world of sports.
Professor Champion gives a brief discussion of the arguments con-
cerning women competing directly against men in athletic compe-
tition.29 He details three proposed programs involving female
athletes, ranging from completely separate teams to teams where
the only criterion is skilla 0 Professor Champion notes that the
standard of review used in sex-based classifications is intermediate
scrutiny, which requires an important governmental purpose and
a classification that is substantially related to the achievement of
that purpose.3 '
Chapter 20 deals with discipline and penalties, and notes the
22. Id. at § 16.4.
23. Id.
24. CHAMPION, supra note 1, at § 16.6.
25. Id. at § 16.5.
26. Id. at § 17.1.
27. Id. at § 17.4.
28. Id. at § 18.2, at 341-42.
29. Id. at § 19.1.
30. Id. at § 19.2.
31. Id. at § 19.6, at 361.
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differences in how they are applied at the high school, college, and
professional levels.
Chapter 21 discusses the numerous issues involving drug test-
ing. Professor Champion accepts the reasonableness of drug test-
ing, stating that since participation in athletics is not a
fundamental right, the standard of review used by courts is that of
rational basis.3 2 While it may be true that participation in high
school athletics is not a fundamental right, being free from unrea-
sonable searches is fundamental. 33 Professor Champion, in his
analysis of the lesser expectation of privacy held by a high school
student, equates being in high school with being in jail.3 4 The
Supreme Court has not made this equation.a Professor Champion
states that the legality of such a search must be justified at its
inception, and appears to feel that the interest of maintaining a
drug-free athletic program provides this justification.36 The
Supreme Court has stated that, for a search to be justified at its
inception, there must be "reasonable grounds for suspecting that
the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is
violating either the law or the rules of the school."'3 7 It could cer-
tainly be argued that a school must show that a drug problem
exists, not only in the country, but in that school, before the school
can set up a random drug testing program based upon suspi-
cionless searches. Of course, once this showing has been made, the
balancing test discussed by Professor Champion3 8 would probably
allow reasonable testing.
The next section of the book deals with sports contracts. In
chapter 22, Professor Champion suggests that a basic understand-
ing of contract law should be sufficient to negotiate a professional
contract.39 The basis for this opinion is the availability of informa-
tion concerning the monetary worth of comparable athletes and
the existence of the Standard Player's Contract (SPK).4° Professor
Champion then discusses the SPK, what the contract contains, and
the possibilities of modifying it.4 ' The chapter ends with helpful
32. Id. at § 21.6, at 389.
33. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV
34. CHAMPION, supra note 1, § 21.5, at 387.
35. See New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985); Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S.
503, 512 n.6 (1969).
36. CHAMPION, supra note 1, § 21.5, at 386-87.
37. New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
38. CHAMPION, supra note 1, § 21.5, at 386.
39. Id. at § 22.1, at 395.
40. Id.
41. Id. at §§ 22.2, 22.3.
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hints for the prospective negotiator.42
Chapter 23 deals with representation of the athlete, including
the Standard Representation Contract and the function of agents.
Registration of agents is also discussed.
The last three sections of the book deal with financial consid-
erations, labor law, and antitrust in sports. The two key concepts
in the area of financial planning are the realization that an ath-
lete's career is usually limited in duration, yet must provide a life-
time of financial security, and that expert financial help is usually
advisable.43 In the area of labor law, Professor Champion focuses
on Major League Baseball.44 He discusses collective bargaining,
the "reserve clause," mediation, and arbitration. 45 The chapter on
antitrust notes the unique arrangement in sports where teams are
in competition with each other but, at the same time, must coop-
erate in order to succeed.46 Professor Champion's view seems to
be that the key to determining whether labor restrictions will be
seen as a violation of antitrust law is whether the restriction was
reached as "a result of bona fide arms-length negotiation between
management and labor," or simply promulgated by manage-
ment.47 If the former, the restriction will probably be allowed. 8
Other antitrust aspects of sports law are also discussed, including
disputes among NFL teams and the regulation of amateur
athletics.49
Also included in the book is an index containing various stan-
dard contracts, a sample tort release, a drug testing consent form,
and various employment contracts.
As previously noted, Professor Champion's apparent intent
was to write a book that is equally readable by attorneys and non-
attorneys. To that end, he has been successful. Although there is
some repetition, it is difficult to conceive of a way to avoid that
problem and still make the concepts understandable to non-attor-
neys. The organization of the book demands repetition, because
much of the case law is applicable to more than one area of liabil-
ity. This writer's main criticisms are aimed at the book's failure to
address the effect that the comparative negligence standard would
42. Id. at § 22.5.
43. Id. at §§ 24.1-24.4.
44. Id. at § 25.1-25.5.
45. Id.
46. Id. at § 26.1.
47. Id. at § 26.3, at 472-73.
48. Id.
49. Id. at §§ 26.4-26.6.
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have on already settled legal concepts, based upon an assumption
of risk standard, and the ready acceptance of drug testing of high
school students without some protest. Otherwise, Professor Cham-
pion does a good job of covering a relatively new and expanding
area of the law in a way useful to his intended audience.
CHARLES EVANS*
* Third year law student at the University of North Dakota School of Law. Mr. Evans
has been actively engaged in all aspects of sports as a player, coach, and official.
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